Sick pay is a common provision in most labor contracts. This paper employs an experimental gift-exchange environment to explore two related questions using both managers and undergraduates as subjects. First, do workers reciprocate generous sick pay with higher effort? Second, do firms benefit from offering sick pay? Our main finding is that workers do reciprocate generous sick pay with higher effort. However, firms benefit from offering sick pay in terms of profits if and only if there is competition among firms for workers. Consequently, competition leads to a higher voluntary provision of sick pay relative to a monopsonistic labor market.
Introduction
Sick pay or sick leave provisions are standard in most labor contracts around the world. 1 Internationally, there is a large variety of different forms of sick pay. 2 Some of this variation is due to regulation. But in countries like the US or the UK, where legal standards are minimal, variety is mainly due to the choice of firms. This poses two interrelated questions. First, how do workers react to different sick pay schemes? Second, will sick pay emerge endogenously because it is profitable for firms to provide it?
By offering sick pay, the firm (partially) insures the worker against income loss due to illness. This does not come without costs for the firm.
Apart from the expected payments to the worker there are well-know moral hazard and adverse selection problems when workers pretend to be sick or when workers are attracted who are sick frequently. 3 Thus, when we observe rational firms voluntarily offering sick pay, they must either expect a higher productivity from the worker or some other part of the compensation package, e.g. the wage, needs to be appropriately adjusted in order to compensate for the expected cost.
In this paper, we use a modified version of the standard gift-exchange experiment in a labor market setting (see e.g. Fehr et al. 1993 Fehr et al. , 1997 Fehr et al. , 2007 to explore these questions. 4 Employers offer a wage scheme and workers choose effort levels. A crucial design feature we introduce is an exogenous probability for workers to become "sick", i.e. they cannot show up for work even if they wanted to exert effort. The second design feature is that firms can offer contracts with two components: a wage if the worker shows up for work and sick pay if he does not, either because he is sick or because he pretends to be (which the employer cannot distinguish).
The fact that labor contracts now involve lotteries makes risk preferences an important input and we elicit them through a Holt and Laury (2002) procedure.
Sick pay may have very different effects depending on whether one considers a monopsonistic firm or firms that need to compete for workers. We first explore to what extent sick pay affects a firm's profit directly through enhanced effort from workers. We shall call this the "gift-exchange effect."
The second, indirect effect may work through self-selection of workers. 5 If it is the case that workers who value sick pay are also those that are productive and provide higher effort, then firms may want to attract these workers by offering contracts with sick pay provision. 6 Our treatments are designed to separate those two effects. In our (M)onospony treatment, each worker is matched to just one employer. In this treatment, only the gift-exchange effect effect can operate. In our (S)election treatment, there is competition among employers for workers such that the selection efect can operate. Falk (2007) finds support for gift-exchange in a field experiment. 5 This important theme has been stressed by Chiappori and Salaine (2003) in empirical work on contracts and by Coles and Treble (1993) in theoretical work on sick leave. 6 Surveys suggest that sick pay and health care are important determinants for the attractiveness of employers to workers. See e.g. Fortune's "100 Best Companies to Work For" list (2008) .
Firms may end up with no workers or with several workers depending on the attractiveness of their contract offers.
Finally, another important design feature is that we use both managers and undergraduate students as subjects. It is often argued that undergraduates are not representative of the population that is relevant for the questions at hand such as, in our case, labor market relations. Undergraduates who lack the experience of actual labor relationships may in fact behave systematically different from more experienced workers or managers. Furthermore, in the context of sick pay, the question of whether one has the responsibility for a family may become important. For these reasons, it is important to start to expand the usual subject pool used by experimental economists to include older and more experienced people. 7 Our main finding is that the gift-exchange effect is rather weak in terms of efforts and actually negative in terms of profits. Although workers react to higher sick pay with higher effort, this does not compensate for the higher expected wage bill of firms. The results are very different when we allow for competition among employers. In order to attract any workers, firms have to offer either generous sick pay or a very generous wage. The self-selection of workers is such that offering sick pay becomes the more cost efficient way for firms to induce the same effort level. As a result, profits are higher with sick pay provision. This, in turn leads to a higher provision of sick pay when 7 Several studies have found significant treatment differences between the behavior of managers and the typical subject population of undergraduate students. Managers are found to be more prosocial in the gift-exchange game, Hannan et al. (2002) ; more trusting in the trust game, Fehr and List (2004) ; and display higher level of strategic play in the "ratchet effect" game, Cooper et al. (1999) . Other studies found small and insignificant differences, see e.g. Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005) .
firms compete for workers relative to a monopsonistic labor market.
Most of our qualitative results are the same for undergraduates and managers. If anything, sick pay contracts are more profitable in the manager treatment. The main reason for this is that our manager subjects have a larger tendency to reciprocate generous contracts with higher effort.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the experimental design and procedures. Results are analyzed and discussed in Section 3. Finally, we close with a brief summary of our findings.
Experimental design and procedures
In our experiment, we implement a modified gift-exchange game between employers and workers. In all periods of the experiment, employers choose a contract to offer to their employees and workers choose efforts given those offered contracts. Workers can choose intended efforts,ẽ, from the set {0, 1, ..., 10}. An effort of 0 is interpreted as skipping work. Then, there is a random draw by the computer, independent across periods and subjects, which with probability p = 1/3, sets the chosen effort to 0. This random draw models the probability that workers become sick and cannot appear at the workplace. Thus, with probability 2/3, realized effort, e, equals intended effort,ẽ; with probability 1/3, realized effort is zero. Note that the employer cannot distinguish the cases when realized effort is zero because the worker chose an intended effort of zero or because the worker became sick. Effort costs for the workers are a function of realized effort as shown in Table 1. 8 8 That is, when agents are sick, they have effort costs of 0. Employers have to choose one contract from a menu of contracts. Each contract is a pair (w, s) consisting of a wage, w, paid whenever the worker shows up for work (i.e. when e > 0), and sick pay, s, which is paid in case the worker does not show up for work (i.e. when realized effort is zero). The fact that wage payments can only be contingent on whether realized effort is larger than zero, is based on the assumption that employer can only verify whether workers show up for work or not. As usual, different effort levels e > 0 cannot be contracted upon e.g. because they cannot be verified in court. 9 The payoffs resulting from contract and effort choices are as follows.
Each unit of effort yields a gross profit of 20 to the employer. Deducting wage payments we obtain
The worker's payoff is given as
The menu of contracts employers can choose from is shown in Table 2. 10 Contracts (0,0), (50,0), and (75,0) provide no sick pay and mimic therefore 9 If they were, there would be, of course, no interesting incentive problem. 10 We restricted the number of contracts to 5 in order to obtain a sufficient number of observations for each contract. depending on the preferences of workers, any of these three contracts could be seen as the best contract in the menu.
The experiment consists of four treatments (see Table 3 for details). In treatment M (short for monopsony) we randomly and anonymously match each worker with one employer. Simultaneously, the employer chooses a contract, and the worker chooses intended efforts for each of the five contracts.
We use the strategy method since otherwise it would be difficult to collect sufficient data on less attractive contracts. 12 Then, the computer randomly (with probability 1/3) decides whether the worker's effort is set to zero. The payoffs of the employer and the worker are determined based on the chosen contract and the realized effort.
A variation of treatment M is treatment M-f (M-"framed"), which is exactly the same as M with the exception that in the instructions the term "illness" or being "sick" is used instead of neutral language like "the computer set efforts to zero." We included this treatment to check whether using 12 To the extent that the use of the strategy method reduces the amount of reciprocal behavior, our results will provide a lower bound for the effectiveness of gift-exchange behavior.
the potentially loaded terms sickness etc. would trigger a different response from subjects. 13 In treatment S (short for selection), there is competition among employers, who can now employ more than one worker. Again, employers choose a contract, and workers choose intended efforts for each of the five contracts.
But now workers have to indicate a preference ranking for the five contracts from the most preferred choice, 1, down to the least preferred choice, 5. Then, we match workers and employers according to their preferences.
Each worker is assigned to that employer who had offered his most preferred contract. If the most preferred contract is not available, then the worker is assigned to the employer offering the next preferred contract and so on. In case there are several employers offering the same contract, workers are distributed between them as equally as possible. If an employer attracts no workers in a given period, his profit is 0. This is an important consequence of self-selection and competition in labor markets. If the offered contract is unappealing, then employers may not find any interested workers. On the other hand, if an employer attracts several workers, his total profit in this period is the sum of profits from all his workers. 14 Finally, the fourth treatment, treatment S-M (S-"managers"), is like treatment S, except that subjects in this treatment are managers instead of undergraduate students. 15 Subjects in this treatment are between 31 and 45 13 In all treatments, we used an employer-worker frame since this seems to be the natural setting. Note, however, that according to results by Fehr et al. (2007) , the employerworker frame and a seller-buyer frame yield essentially identical results.
14 Another option would have been to use the average profit generated by workers. However, using total profits seemed more realistic to us for labor markets. Also, we wanted to maximize competitive pressure among employers. 15 For obvious reasons we did not have unlimited access to a subject pool with managers.
years old, most with at least 10 years of work experience. Most subjects are already quite advanced in their career (vice president or similar) and have leadership experience. Motivating their coworkers and hiring new staff are routine tasks in their work day. Note: * Thus refers to the explanation for the exogenous probability of 0 effort. In all treatments a worker-employer frame is used.
The experiment is repeated for 10 rounds using a perfect stranger matching (such that no employer is matched twice to the same worker) in treatments M and M-f. In treatments S and S-M, stranger matching is not possible and we match subjects in fixed groups of 10 subjects, 5 workers and 5
employers. This choice was made with the intention of minimizing repeated game effects and maximizing the competition among employers while still producing a sufficient number of independent observations. Subjects' feedback at the end of each period is limited to results from their own match to rule out reputation effects. Workers learn which wage offer their employer made, whether the effort was set to 0 by the computer, and their wage. Employers only learn their own payoff. Subjects cannot observe their partner's past behavior.
We therefore chose to let them play the selection treatment as we expected the most interesting effects to occur in this treatment.
At the end of the gift-exchange experiment there is a questionnaire (see Appendix A.3) with a number of questions regarding subjects' demographics and preferences with respect to hypothetical labor contracts with varying levels of sick pay. Finally, a second questionnaire elicits risk preferences following the method introduced by Holt and Laury (2002) . This questionnaire is incentivized in the usual way by randomly selecting one pair of lotteries by the throw of a 10-sided die. The chosen lottery is then resolved by throwing the die again.
In total, 150 subjects participated in our experiment. No subject participated in more than one session. The experiments were conducted in the computer lab at the University of Mannheim. All undergraduate subjects were recruited via the ORSEE online recruiting system (Greiner, 2004) . The managers were participants in an Executive MBA class. The experiment was conducted during lunch break of the course and participation in the experiment was voluntary. However, most participants chose to take part in the experiment.
For the experiment, we used the z-tree software package provided by Fischbacher (2007) . After reading the instructions (see Appendix), subjects had to answer a series of detailed questions in order to make sure that they understood the experimental instructions and were able to do all necessary calculations. Subjects who could not correctly answer the questions after additional explanation were replaced before proceeding.
To avoid wealth effects, subjects were paid their earnings from one randomly selected period from the gift-exchange experiment. Each subject threw a die to determine which period's payoff was being paid. Payoffs from this round were paid out with an exchange rate of 10 points = 1 euro. Additionally, subjects received their outcome from the Holt-Laury questionnaire plus a show-up fee of 7.50 euro. The average payoff was about 15.82 euro (about US $25 at the time of the experiment). 16 Experiments lasted about 90 minutes including instruction time.
Results
As a first step we note that there are no significant differences between sessions conducted with a "sickness frame" in treatment M and those without.
Neither the contract offers by employers nor the effort choices by workers differ significantly between treatment M-f and treatment M, according to MWU-tests. Thus, from now on, we pool the data from these two treatments. e(0, 0).
Effort choices and profits
The above p-values were obtained from running OLS regressions on the The standard gift-exchange result is replicated in our experiment. Although workers in treatment M are certain of never meeting again the same employer, they reciprocate higher wage offers with higher effort as e(75, 0) > e(50, 0) > e(0, 0). Furthermore, offering sick pay also increases efforts, as e(50, 20) > e(50, 0). However, a sick pay contract with 100% replacement rate is unprofitable for the employer. Although contract (50,0) yields a lower expected wage than contract (35,35), and therefore comes at lower cost for the employer, the effort choices for the former are significantly higher than those for the latter.
One interesting observation is that effort choices of managers in treat- . Finally, about 90% of all workers skip work when the employer offers 18 See Table 8 in the Appendix for the exact numbers.
no compensation at all.
We can summarize all this in
Result 1 (Effort choices)
1. The standard gift exchange result is replicated in our experiment:
higher wage offers significantly increase effort choices of workers.
2. Offering sick pay also significantly increases efforts of workers.
3. Managers exert higher efforts and "skip work" less frequently than undergraduate students.
In order to decide whether it is worthwhile for an employer to offer sick pay, we have to look at profits generated from offering the various contracts.
However, one should be aware of the fact that the absolute level of profits depends on the parametrization of the profit function. Thus, statements about the profitability of contracts need to be treated with care. Having said this, we calculate expected profit of employer j when offering contract (w, s) as
that is, given the intended effortsẽ i of employer j's workers i ∈ W j . By using intended efforts rather than realized efforts, which can be set to zero by illness, we eliminate the noise due to the random incidences of illness. Figure   1 shows the mean number of workers an employer attracted and the mean expected profits of employers depending on the contract offered to workers. The left panel of Figure 1 refers to treatment M. Given the one-to-one matching structure in M, obviously each employer had one worker. With respect to expected profits, we observe that the best contract is contract (75,0)
closely followed by (0,0). As seen in Table 4 , contract (75,0) elicits the highest efforts from workers and in treatment M, this overcompensates for the high wage payments. Somewhat surprisingly, a few workers exert effort even when offered no wage at all, which causes positive profits for the (0,0) contract. On the other hand, both contracts that offer sick pay produce losses for employers on average. In order to assess significances, we again run OLS regressions of expected profits on dummies for treatment/contract combinations and the period variable, and rotate the omitted treatment/contract dummy. Although we use a relatively conservative approach by clustering for subjects, we find that in treatment M, profits with contract (75,0) and with (0,0) are both significantly higher than those with (35,35) at the 5% level. 19 The picture changes when we consider competition among employers as in treatment S (see the center panel of Figure 1 ). Now the (75,0) contract, which was best in M, is the worst contract (the difference in profits for the (75,0) contract between treatments M and S is is significant at the 5% level, for both the OLS regression and MWU-tests). 20 who offered contract (0,0) failed to attract a single worker. The full insurance contract (35,35) remains a loss maker for employers but attracts its share of workers. 21 The number of workers that each contract attracts is very similar in treatment S-M with managers (see the right panel of Figure 1 ). However, given that managers consistently exert higher efforts, all contracts that offer a positive wage now become profitable for employers. But again, the (50,20) contract, a contract that offers partial sick pay, seems to be the optimal contract for employers as it produces the highest profits and attracts a substantial number of workers. 22 In contrast to treatment S, even the full insurance contract (35,35) is now slightly profitable.
Result 2 (Profits)

Without competition among employers (treatment M), sick pay
is not a profitable contract option for employers. Both contracts that offer sick pay are loss makers. The contract with the most generous wage and no sick pay, contract (75,0) is the most profitable.
With competition among employers (treatments S and S-M), the
(50,20) contract, a contract that offers partial sick pay, is the optimal contract for employers. In treatment S, it is the only contract that roughly breaks even and attracts a substantial number 21 Profits with (35,35) are significantly lower than those with (50,0) and (0,0) at the 1% level according to the OLS regressions. 22 Expected profits with contract (50,20) are significantly higher than those with (50,0) and (0,0) at the 5% level. All other differences are not significant, at least when standard errors are clustered. of workers. In treatment S-M, it is the most profitable contract and attracts a sufficient number of workers. is rarely offered in treatment S because subjects immediately realized that they could attract no workers with this contract. 23 The full insurance contract (35,35) is among the least popular contracts in both treatments. To assess the significance of differences we ran multinomial logit regressions as a function of a treatment dummy, period, and all variables from the questionnaire, clustered by subject, using contract (35,35) as the base. Contract (50,20) is offered significantly more frequently in treatments S and S-M than in treatment M (p < 0.01). Also, contract (75,0) is offered more frequently in treatment S-M than in treatment M (p < 0.05). On the other hand, contract (0,0) is offered significantly less frequently in treatments S and S-M (at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively). 24 23 There is no noticable time trend in the data on offered contracts. 24 All significance levels remain unchanged when we drop the questionnaire variables from the regression. (0,0) is hardly ever offered.
Contract offers
Does sick pay attract more reciprocal workers?
When there is competition among employers for workers, employers may try to attract more reciprocal workers by offering sick pay. We shall call a worker "more reciprocal" than another if for a given expected wage (including sick pay) he exerts higher effort or if for given effort he is satisfied with a lower expected wage.
Offering sick pay could turn out to be a competitive advantage for firms if one of the following two mechanisms is at work. There is a direct, behavioral mechanism according to which reciprocal workers may see sick pay as a "nice contract", 25 and would self-select accordingly. There is also a more indirect mechanism, which works however only if risk-averse workers are at the same time more reciprocal. Employers could then attract those more reciprocal workers by offering generous sick pay, which would appeal to risk averse workers more. We will try to distinguish among the two mechanisms with 25 the use of our questionnaire data on risk aversion and demographics. Note: Shown are the percentages of workers who rank a particular contract first. When workers rank contracts differently in different periods, their ranking enter weighted by the number of periods in which they rank this contract first. Table 5 shows the percentages of workers who rank a particular contract as their first choice. The most popular contract is clearly the (75,0) con- We find clear evidence in both treatments that the sick pay contract (50,20) attracts reciprocal workers. Table 6 lower. 26 Consequently, the second row of Table 6 shows that the mean profit created by a worker who prefers the (50,20) contract is substantially higher.
The same holds even more pronounced for treatment S-M. In contrast to the effort choices of all workers (see Table 4 ), intended efforts of workers who prefer contract (50,20) are actually higher than those of workers who prefer (75,0). The resulting differences in profits created by workers are sizable.
Given this finding that sick pay attracts reciprocal workers, we now explore whether risk preferences or other observables can account for this selfselection. 27 To test this we ran a regression (Probit, clustered by subject) on the probability of preferring the (50,20) contract among those who ranked (75,0) or (50,20) first with the explanatory variables being the Holt/Laury risk cutoff, period, a treatment dummy, and all questions from the postexperimental questionnaire. 28 The results in Table 7 show that none of the characteristics is significant at the 5% level, although the coefficients for risk aversion (the Holt/Laury risk cutoff) and "has worked full-time" are weakly significant at the 10% level and positive. 26 Assuming that workers exert an effort of at least 1, the expected wage is 50 for the (75,0) contract and 40 for the (50,20) contract.
27 See Table 9 in the Appendix for summary statistic of subjects' characteristics. 28 Except 'having children' since this is strongly correlated with 'married'. Note: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by subject; data includes all subjects who ranked either contract (75,0) or (50,20) first. * * * significant at 1%-level; * significant at 10%-level. Table 7 already shows that workers choosing the two most popular contracts do not seem to differ much according to their mean risk cutoff. This finding also holds when we look at the entire distribution of risk cutoffs (see Figure 3) . Although the distribution of risk cutoffs of workers who choose (75,0) is unambiguously to the left (that is, less risk averse) compared to workers who choose (50, 20) , there is only a small difference, which is not significant according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
Using the data from the Holt and Laury questionnaire and assuming a constant relative risk aversion utility function U (x) = x 1−r /(1 − r), we can also compute for each period the utility subjects would gain from choosing each of the five contracts, given their actually chosen efforts for these contracts. That way we obtain rankings of contracts which we can compare to the rankings announced by subjects. 29 If subjects' rankings were only influenced by risk aversion, the two rankings should coincide. In fact, the risk aversion ranking matches the real ranking only for 29.8% of cases. Even when predicting just the contract which subjects ranked best, instead of the full ranking, risk aversion alone manages to explain only 60.2% of all cases (which is only moderately better than random choice given that more than 85% of workers chose one of the two contracts (75,0) and (50,20)). 30
Result 4 (Self-selection of workers) We find clear evidence that employers can attract more reciprocal workers by offering sick pay. How- 29 Since the Holt and Laury procedure only pins down the parameter of relative risk aversion to an interval, we occasionally get two different rankings for the upper and lower boundary. In those cases, we use the ranking which is closer to the real ranking. Using an exact value for relative risk aversion would lead to even lower explanatory power. 30 Pooled data from treatments S and S-M. Manager's choices are slightly better explained by risk preferences than undergraduate's.
ever, this self-selection is only weakly influenced by risk preferences and other observable characteristics of workers.
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to better understand the reasons why firms offer sick pay. Sick pay provision is an important part of most labor contracts. It partially insures the workers against sudden loss of income due to illness. Therefore, some level of sick pay may be socially desirable. Indeed, many countries already mandate relatively high levels of sick pay. More importantly, however, even in countries with minimal regulation (e.g. the US), sick pay or sick leave is commonly offered. This poses a puzzle that we address in this paper: if firms are willing to raise their wage bills by offering sick pay, what is it that they get in return? It could be that workers simply reciprocate higher wages with even higher efforts; or it could be that competition for workers allows productive workers to self-select to contracts with sick pay.
The first conjecture is readily rejected by the data. It is certainly not true that workers provide sufficiently high efforts to justify the usage of sick pay. This can be nicely seen in our monopsony treatment where each worker is randomly assigned to a unique employer. Although the average effort is higher for the contract with sick pay (50,20) than without (50,0), the cost of the increased wage bill is excessive and makes sick pay unprofitable.
The second way how employers can benefit from sick pay is by using it to attract hopefully more reciprocal workers. And indeed we find evidence that sick pay attracts workers who are more reciprocal in the sense that they provide higher effort for the same expected wage or provide the same effort for a lower expected wage.
We find no strong evidence, however, that the selection of workers depends on their risk preferences. If safer contracts attract more risk averse workers who are in addition also more productive, then employers could benefit from offering sick pay. However, this is not borne out by the data.
There is no significant difference in risk measures between those workers who rank sick pay contract (50,20) as their first choice and those who rank (75,0) as their first choice.
Our experiments clearly demonstrate that if there is any value to sick pay, then it is driven by competition in the labor market. In our selection treatment, where employers compete for workers, only two contracts are able to attract meaningful number of workers: the most generous contract without sick pay (75,0) and the (50,20) contract with partial sick pay. It would be futile to offer other contracts because firms would not be able to find employees. In a competitive labor market, firms must be concerned not only with the effort of workers but also with the kind of workers that find the contract appealing. In our selection treatment, contract (75,0) attracts more workers than contract (50,20) but efforts are not sufficiently high to compensate for the higher expected wage bill. Thus, the contract with sick pay yields higher profits. Employers clearly seem to realize this because they offer contract (50,20) with the highest frequency in the selection treatment while it is almost never chosen in the monopsony treatment.
Our results support the market driven justification for sick pay. The competition for workers seems to be crucial in sorting the workers into ap-propriate contracts and making sick pay profitable. Most importantly, our experiments show that competitive labor markets are able to provide sick pay on their own without external intervention. This contributes to the on-going debate on the necessity of regulation and mandatory sick pay provision.
It would be premature, however, to conclude that sick pay provision can be entirely left to the market. Recall that in our setting firms were competing for workers. We would hypothesize that in a setting in which workers compete for jobs, sick pay would be less likely to emerge endogenously. This would be an interesting extension for future work.
Furthermore, all workers in our experiment had equal characteristics and productivities. The fact that employers do condition the provision of sick pay on characteristics of workers is shown by data from the US. 31 A future experiment could therefore consider different types of workers to account for a possible adverse selection problem on top of the moral hazard problem. raise your hand. We will then come to you.
In the experiment, there will be "employers" (E) and "workers" (W).
Your role will be assigned by the computer at the start of the experiment.
You will be in the same role during the entire experiment.
The experiment will have 10 periods. In each period, each worker will be matched with a new employer. That means it will never happen that an worker and an employer will be matched with each other more than once.
No employer learns which worker is matched with him/her in any given period. Neither do the workers learn about the identity of their matched employers.
In each period the employer will make a wage offer to the worker. Doing so, he/she can choose between five different wage offers. The worker chooses an effort level for each contract. Since at this time the worker does not yet know the wage offer of the employer, he/she has to provide an effort level for all five possible wage offers. However, only the wage offer actually made by the employer determines the payment.
The effort can be any integer between 0 and 10. Effort is associated with costs for the worker, as given in the With probability 1/3, the worker falls ill and the realized effort, which determines the payoff to employer and worker, is 0. [In Treatment M this sentence is "With probability 1/3, the effort chosen by the worker will be set to 0 by the computer."] This happens for reasons that neither worker nor employer can influence. The probability of this happening in any period is independent of all previous periods and independent of the effort chosen by the worker. After this, a new period starts. After 10 periods, there will be a questionnaire. At the end of the experiment, we will call you out for payment.
A 10-sided die will be used to determine a random period. You will be paid the payoff from this period with an exchange rate of 10 points=1 euro in cash.
Additionally, you will get 7.50 euro for your participation.
A.2 Instructions, Treatments S and S-M
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully. From now on, do not talk to your neighbors. Please turn off your mobile phone and keep it turned off till the end of the experiment. If you have any questions, raise your hand. We will then come to you.
The experiment will have 10 periods. You are in a group of 5 workers and 5 employers. In each period, the employers will make wage offers to the workers. Doing so, they can choose between five different wage offers. The worker chooses an effort level for each contract. Since at this time the worker does not yet know the wage offer of the employer he/she will be matched with, he/she has to provide an effort level for all five possible wage offers. Furthermore, the worker provides a ranking of all possible wage offers: The wage offer he/she likes best is assigned a 1, the second best a 2 and so on . . . This ranking determines with which employer (and which wage offer) an worker will be matched with. The workers will be split among the employers in the following way. An employer can employ several workers, but an worker can only work for one employer. Among all wage offers made by the employers, the computer will always find that one which is best according to the ranking of the particular worker. The worker will then be matched with this employer. If several employers are offering the same contract, workers who prefer this contract will be split among those employers randomly.
The payoff of an worker is determined by his/her effort and the wage offer made by the employer he/she is matched with.
The payoff of an employer is determined by his/her wage offer and the effort of the workers he/she is matched with. If an employer is not matched with any worker (because all workers preferred the wage offers of other employers), he/she does not get any payoff this period.
The effort can be any integer between 0 and 10. The effort is associated with costs for the worker, as given in the table below. All workers have the same cost table. The revenue of the employer is twenty times the effort, but one has to subtract the wage payment from this. With probability 1/3, the effort chosen by the worker will be set to 0 by the computer. In this case, the realized effort, which determines the payoff to employer and worker, is 0. This happens for reasons that neither worker nor employer can influence. The probability of this happening in any period is independent of all previous periods and independent of the effort chosen by the worker.
The five possible wage offers, which the employer can make, are: Note that the payoff always depends on the realized effort (which may have been set to 0 by the computer).
Payoff in one period
At the end of each period, workers learn which wage offer their employer made, whether the effort was set to 0 by the computer and their wage. After this, a new period starts. After 10 periods, there will be a questionnaire. At the end of the experiment, we will call you out for payment.
Additionally, you will get 7.50 euro for your participation. 
